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ISSUE
Have employees whose union agreed
with their employers that arbitra-
tion was “the sole and exclusive
remedy for violations” of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) waived the right to a judi-
cial forum for alleged violations of
the ADEA, even when the union
controls access to the arbitration
and refuses to submit the employ-
ees’ grievances to arbitration?
FACTS
The respondents are employees of
Temco Services Industries, a build-
ing service and cleaning contractor.
Before August 2003, the respon-
dents worked as night watchmen in
a commercial office building owned
by Pennsylvania Building Company
and 14 Penn Plaza LLC. Since that
time, the respondents have been
working as night porters and light-
duty cleaners in the same building.
Respondents are also members of
Local 32BJ of the Service
Employees International Union.
They are covered by the collective
bargaining agreement between the
union and the Realty Advisory
Board on Labor Relations, Inc., the
multiemployer bargaining associa-
tion of the New York City real estate
industry. The collective bargaining
agreement contains a mandatory
arbitration clause for discrimination
claims, which provides as follows:
There shall be no discrimination
against any present or future
employee by reason of race,
creed, color, age, disability,
national origin, sex, union mem-
bership, or any characteristic
protected by law, including, but
not limited to, claims made pur-
suant to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment
Act, the New York State Human
Rights Law, the New York City
Human Rights Code, New Jersey
Law Against Discrimination, New
Jersey Conscientious Employee
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ARGUMENT DATE:
DECEMBER 1, 2008
FROM: THE SECOND CIRCUIT
When their union 
refused to take their 
discrimination claims to
arbitration, several
employees filed age 
discrimination lawsuits
against their employers
instead. The employers
then sought to compel
the employees to submit
their discrimination
claims to arbitration or
to have the lawsuits 
dismissed. The Supreme
Court is now asked to
decide whether 
employees covered by a
collective bargaining
agreement’s arbitration
clause must arbitrate
their statutory 
discrimination claims
even if their union has
declined to take their
claims to arbitration.
American Bar Association
Protection Act, Connecticut Fair
Employer Practices Act, or any
other similar laws, rules or regu-
lations. All such claims shall be
subject to the grievance and arbi-
tration procedure (Articles V and
VI) as the sole and exclusive rem-
edy for violations. Arbitrators
shall apply appropriate law in
rendering decisions based upon
claims of discrimination.
In August 2003, Temco contracted
with Spartan Security, a security
services contractor and affiliate of
Temco, to provide certain security
personnel, including night watch-
men, for the building. Spartan
brought in new employees.
Respondents, who had been
employed as night watchmen, were
reassigned to different locations and
less desirable positions as night
porters and light-duty cleaners with-
in the building.
The respondents filed grievances
with the union under the collective
bargaining agreement. The respon-
dents claimed that, as the only
building employees over the age of
50, they were wrongfully transferred
and denied overtime in violation of
various provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement, including the
provision that prohibited discrimi-
nation on the basis of age. The
respondents’ grievances were sub-
mitted to arbitration. Shortly after
the arbitration began, the union
declined to pursue the respondent’s
claims of wrongful transfer and age
discrimination, electing to pursue
only the claims regarding denial of
overtime on behalf of all plaintiffs
and wrongful denial of promotion on
behalf of respondent Steven Pyett.
According to the respondents, the
union’s counsel explained to them
that “since the Union had consent-
ed to Spartan Security being
brought into the building,” the
union could not contest their
replacement as night watchmen by
personnel of Spartan Security. On
August 10, 2005, the arbitrator
issued his award, denying respon-
dents’ arbitrated claims in their
entirety.
On May 26, 2004, while the arbitra-
tion was ongoing, but after the
union declined to submit the age
discrimination claims, the respon-
dents filed charges of discrimination
with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. The
EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice
of Rights on June 29, 2004, for
respondents Thomas O’Connell and
Michael Phillips, and on September
14, 2004, for respondent Pyett. In
each case, the EEOC determined
that its “review of the evidence ...
fail[ed] to indicate that a violation
ha[d] occurred,” and notified each
respondent of his right to sue. On
September 23, 2004, respondents
commenced this action against the
petitioners in district court, pursu-
ing those claims that the union did
not submit to arbitration. The
respondents alleged that they had
been transferred from their posi-
tions and replaced by younger secu-
rity officers in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act,
the New York State Human Rights
Law, and the New York City
Administrative Code.
The petitioners moved for dismissal
for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted and, in
the alternative, to compel arbitra-
tion. In an order dated May 31,
2006, the district court denied both
motions. With respect to petitioners’
motion to compel arbitration, 
the district court referred to its
decision in Granados v. Harvard
Maintenance, Inc., 2006 WL
435731 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2006). In
that case, the district court “con-
cluded based largely on binding
Second Circuit precedent that even
a clear and unmistakable union-
negotiated waiver of a right to liti-
gate certain federal and state 
statutory claims in a judicial 
forum is unenforceable.” Pyett v.
Pennsylvania Building Co., 2006
WL 1520517, *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 1,
2006). 
Affirming the district court, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the 
arbitration clauses in the collective
bargaining agreements were unen-
forceable to the extent that they
waived the rights of covered work-
ers to a judicial forum for federal
statutory causes of action. Pyett v.
Pennsylvania Building Co., 498
F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007). 
The Supreme Court granted peti-
tioners’ request for request for
review. 128 S.Ct. 1223 (2008).
CASE ANALYSIS
The petitioners assert that the arbi-
tration provision in this case is an
enforceable and “clear and unmis-
takable” waiver of the respondent
union members’ right to a judicial
forum. The petitioners say that the
union, as the respondents’ exclusive
bargaining representative, was
authorized and entitled to bargain
over all terms and conditions of
their employment. According to the
petitioners, the respondents were
given an unimpeded opportunity to
arbitrate their claims, which they
refused in favor of filing a federal
lawsuit, contrary to the requirement
in the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The petitioners claim the
“Second Circuit’s judicial voiding of
the arbitration provision flouts
repeated decisions from [the
Supreme] Court that agreements to
arbitrate statutory claims are
enforceable unless Congress itself
has evinced an intention to pre-
clude a waiver of judicial remedies
for the statutory rights at issue.”
The petitioners assert that it is a
fundamental premise of labor law
(Continued on Page 154)
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that a union has the power to nego-
tiate agreements with the employer
as to virtually every aspect of its
members’ employment and that
those agreements are as binding on
the employees as if they had negoti-
ated them themselves. The petition-
ers claim that the fact that an
employee has a statutory discrimi-
nation theory as well as a contract
theory for seeking recovery does not
alter the union’s bargaining authori-
ty. They say it is appropriate for a
union to bargain collectively over
the method of resolving such claims
in exchange for valuable conces-
sions. According to the petitioners,
the Second Circuit’s categorical ban
not only cuts against the national
policy favoring informal resolution of
workplace disputes, but also under-
mines the role of the union in nego-
tiating on behalf of its members.
Asserting there is no evidence that
Congress ever distinguished
between promises to arbitrate statu-
tory discrimination claims based on
whether the promises were individ-
ually made or collectively bar-
gained, the petitioners contend that
the Second Circuit’s distinction cre-
ates perverse results. They say that
arbitral arrangements are much
more likely to be advantageous to
employees when they are collective-
ly bargained. If unions cannot make
such promises, petitioners argue,
such a term of employment would
become a nonmandatory subject of
bargaining that the employer could
impose on employees while simply
bypassing the union. 
According to the petitioners, the
Second Circuit’s reliance on
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36 (1974), cannot be sus-
tained. The petitioners assert that,
contrary to the Second Circuit’s
view, Gardner-Denver decided
nothing about whether clear collec-
tively bargained promises to arbi-
trate statutory discrimination claims
are categorically unenforceable. The
petitioners view Gardner-Denver as
holding only that an arbitrator’s res-
olution of a contractual claim does
not preclude a statutory claim
under Title VII when the parties had
not expressly agreed to arbitrate the
statutory claim and the arbitrator
therefore had no power to decide it.
Petitioners say that Gardner-
Denver did not address whether
Congress had intended to preclude
employers from invoking the
Federal Arbitration Act to compel
arbitration when, as in the present
case, the employees’ union had
clearly agreed on behalf of its mem-
bers that all their statutory discrimi-
nation claims would be arbitrated
with the arbitrators applying appro-
priate law and remedies. 
The petitioners stress that collective
bargaining agreements may waive
individual rights if they expressly so
provide. They state that speculative
risks that certain statutory goals
may be disserved (e.g., the risk that
a union might subordinate the
employee’s interest in his or her
own claim to the union’s interests)
are insufficient as a matter of law to
defeat a motion to compel arbitra-
tion under the Federal Arbitration
Act. 
Disagreeing with the petitioners, the
respondents contend the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that a
union-controlled arbitration agree-
ment does not preclude an individ-
ual employee from pursuing his or
her statutory anti-discrimination
claims in court. They argue that
these Supreme Court decisions
properly recognize that, in a union-
controlled arbitration process, an
employee is unable to vindicate the
employee’s individual, substantive
statutory anti-discrimination rights.
According to the respondents, 
the Supreme Court’s holding in
Gardner-Denver, that a union can-
not waive an employee’s right to a
judicial forum under the federal
anti-discrimination statutes, applies
directly to this case. Respondents
also say that in Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991), the Court reiterated the
concern expressed in Gardner-
Denver that allowing the union to
waive this right would substitute the
union’s interests for the employee’s
anti-discrimination rights.
The respondents claim that those
decisions are consistent with the
limited legal powers conferred on
unions by federal statute. Although
a union is authorized to waive
employees’ collective rights in order
to further self-governance between
the employer and the union, the
respondents explain that the union’s
waiver authority does not extend 
to employees’ individual, noneco-
nomic rights under the federal anti-
discrimination statutes. They reason
that a union is obligated to further
the collective interest of its bargain-
ing unit, and this obligation neces-
sarily takes precedence over, and
often conflicts with, the individual
interests and rights of its employ-
ees. Because the federal anti-
discrimination statutes protect, not
majoritarian processes, but an indi-
vidual’s right to equal employment
opportunities, the respondents say
that the vindication of that right can
only be committed to arbitration by
the aggrieved individual and not by
the union in a collective bargaining
agreement. Moreover, the respon-
dents contend that labor arbitra-
tion’s focus on the “law of the shop”
is ill-suited to resolve statutory dis-
crimination claims. (The law of the
shop, sometimes referred to as
industrial common law, is found in
the practices of an industry or a
work site.)
Noting that the ADEA expressly
requires that any waiver of an
employee’s right to litigate be made
American Bar Association
by that affected individual, the
respondents argue that the union is
precluded from waiving an employ-
ee’s ADEA rights. Because the rights
afforded under the ADEA and other
anti-discrimination statutes are
important public rights that devolve
on employees as individuals and not
as members of a collective bargain-
ing unit, the respondents assert that
the union cannot through a collec-
tive bargaining agreement deprive
employees of their ability to vindi-
cate those rights individually and in
court with the right to a jury trial. It
is the respondents’ position that
allowing union waiver would subju-
gate employees’ anti-discrimination
rights to the collective interest of
the union. They state that the
potential for the employee to estab-
lish a duty-of-fair-representation
claim is a poor substitute for the
rights and remedies available to 
that employee under federal anti-
discrimination law.
Assuming it were somehow legally
possible for a union to waive an
individual’s right to pursue a judicial
forum for his or her ADEA claims,
the respondents contend that arbi-
tration could not be compelled in
this case because the respondents
cannot “effectively … vindicate”
their rights in arbitration under the
collective bargaining agreement.
While the petitioners seek to com-
pel the respondents to arbitrate
with them, the respondents say that
under the collective bargaining
agreement, they have no right to
invoke its arbitration provision over
the union’s objection. Thus, the
respondents conclude there is no
arbitral forum to which the petition-
ers can compel them to arbitrate. 
SIGNIFICANCE
This case focuses on the tension
between two lines of Supreme Court
case law: Gardner-Denver (involv-
ing arbitration of statutory discrimi-
nation claims under the arbitration
clause in a collective bargaining
agreement), and Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson (involving arbi-
tration of statutory discrimination
claims under the arbitration clause
in an individual’s employment
agreement). Compare Wright v.
Universal Maritime Service Corp.,
525 U.S. 70 (1998) (holding that, in
order for a union to waive employ-
ees’ rights to a judicial forum for
statutory discrimination claims, the
agreement to arbitrate such claims
must be clear and unmistakable);
with EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,
534 U.S. 279 (2002) (holding that
an agreement between employer
and employee to arbitrate employ-
ment-related disputes does not bar
the EEOC from pursuing victim-spe-
cific judicial relief in an Americans
with Disabilities Act enforcement
action). 
In Gardner-Denver, the Supreme
Court addressed how statutes pro-
hibiting employment discrimination
related to the system of collective
bargaining and grievance arbitration.
Under Gardner-Denver, if a union
chooses not to pursue a discrimina-
tion claim to arbitration, the employ-
ee-grievant is free to pursue the
employee’s statutory discrimination
claim in court. Gardner-Denver also
held that, if the union takes a statu-
tory discrimination claim to arbitra-
tion and does not prevail, the indi-
vidual employee may avail himself or
herself of legal relief de novo, though
the arbitration decision can be given
weight as evidence in the later civil
proceeding.
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson, the
Supreme Court concluded that
Congress did not intend to preclude
arbitration of age discrimination
claims where an individual’s
employment agreement provided for
arbitration of discrimination claims.
The Supreme Court did not, howev-
er, determine whether an employer
and a union could agree that labor
arbitration could be the sole and
exclusive procedure for resolving
statutory age discrimination claims.
Labor arbitration (sometimes called
grievance arbitration) is an out-
growth of collective bargaining.
Labor arbitration grew to maturity
in the post–World War II era. During
the war, employers and unions had
resolved many disputes through
arbitration. Because of their
wartime successes, labor unions and
employers continued to employ
labor arbitration after the war. In
labor arbitration—arbitration that is
the product of a collective bargain-
ing agreement—access to and con-
duct of the arbitration is controlled
by the union, and not by the indi-
vidual employee. The enforceability
of the agreement is governed by fed-
eral common law under § 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act, not by the Federal
Arbitration Act or state law. See
Wright v. Universal Maritime
Service. Labor arbitration claims
(referred to as grievances) are heard
by persons normally selected from a
panel of labor arbitrators. Almost 40
percent of labor arbitrators are
trained in industrial relations—not
the law. The procedures are based
on industrial relations principles
and do not include prehearing dis-
covery of evidence. Moreover, the
advocate’s obligation is to the union
and not to the individual employee. 
Unlike labor arbitration (or griev-
ance arbitration), employment arbi-
tration is conducted under an indi-
vidual employment contract cov-
ered, in most cases, by the Federal
Arbitration Act. The enforceability
of an employment arbitration 
clause is determined by state law.
Employment arbitration is generally
subject to legal procedures such as
prehearing discovery, representation
of the individual employee by legal
counsel, and the same burdens of
proof as would be applicable in a
judicial forum. 
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In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 533 U.S. 448 (1957), the
Supreme Court held a collective
bargaining agreement’s provision for
grievance arbitration was enforce-
able—not by reference to the
Federal Arbitration Act—but under
§ 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. The
Court found that § 301 provided for
a uniform federal common law of
the collective bargaining agreement
fashioned by the judiciary out of
national labor policy and limited
only by judicial “inventiveness.”
Three years later, the Supreme
Court found labor arbitration to 
be an integral element of the
autonomous system of self-govern-
ment created by the collective bar-
gaining relationship. United
Steelworkers of America v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); United Steelworkers of
American v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of
America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). The
Supreme Court explained that,
unlike in commercial arbitration
where arbitration is a substitute for
litigation, labor arbitration is a sub-
stitute for a strike. 
The Supreme Court has recognized
that individuals have limited rights
to enforce their individual rights
under collective bargaining. An
employee must first attempt to
exhaust the grievance-arbitration
procedure. Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). After
exhausting the grievance-arbitration
procedure, an employee can sue the
employer for an alleged breach of
contract only if the employee could
prove that the union had breached
its duty of fair representation, either
in declining to take the case to arbi-
tration, or in its inadequate presen-
tation of the claim in arbitration.
See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967); Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976). 
A breach of a union’s duty of fair
representation occurs when a
union’s conduct toward a member of
the collective bargaining unit it rep-
resents is arbitrary, discriminatory,
or in bad faith. A union may not
arbitrarily ignore a meritorious
grievance nor may it process the
grievance in a perfunctory manner.
A union’s refusal to take an employ-
ee’s grievance to arbitration is
wrongful only if it can be fairly
characterized as far outside a wide
range of reasonableness, or else
wholly irrational or arbitrary. Where
a union breaches the duty of fair
representation in not arbitrating a
claim, the union bears a significant
share of any resulting liability
should it be found that the employ-
er discriminated against the
employee. See Bowen v U.S. Postal
Service, 451 U.S. 212 (1983). If
statutory discrimination claims are
deemed covered by a grievance-
arbitration procedure, an employer
would bear no liability for wrongful
discriminatory conduct if the union
has not breached the duty of fair
representation in declining to take
an employee’s discrimination claim
to arbitration.
In Wright v. Universal Maritime,
the Supreme Court held that the
general arbitration clause in a col-
lective bargaining agreement did not
require an employee to use the arbi-
tration procedure for a claim that
the employer had violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The
Court said that, in order for a union
to waive employees’ rights to a judi-
cial forum for statutory discrimina-
tion claims, the agreement to arbi-
trate such claims must be clear and
unmistakable. Although finding
there was no clear and unmistak-
able waiver in the collective bar-
gaining agreement, the Court did
not reach the question of whether
such a waiver would be enforceable.
In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., the
Supreme Court held that an agree-
ment between an employer and an
employee to arbitrate employment-
related disputes does not bar the
EEOC from pursuing victim-specific
judicial relief in an Americans with
Disabilities Act enforcement action.
However, in the present case, the
EEOC declined to pursue an action
for judicial relief on behalf of the
respondents.
If the Supreme Court rules in favor
of the petitioners, an employee cov-
ered by an arbitration clause in a
collective bargaining agreement
whose claims were not submitted to
arbitration would have to either per-
suade the EEOC to litigate on the
employee’s behalf, or else bring a 
§ 301 claim conditioning the vindi-
cation of the employee’s statutory
rights on the employee’s success in
a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation claim. Likewise, employ-
ers whose collective bargaining
agreements contain arbitration
clauses that explicitly provide that
arbitration is the sole and exclusive
remedy for violation of anti-discrim-
ination statutes will be able to com-
pel arbitration instead of defending
lawsuits alleging discrimination. 
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